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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for holding these hearings and for providing an opportunity for me to present
my views and to share information gathered on recent visits to the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and in
ongoing work in the field of the rule of law in China. Given Hong Kong's population,
strategic position, and economic importance, it remains necessary to focus upon a number
of other significant considerations in formulating United States policy towards the
HKSAR. Of course, the United States has enacted in domestic law the Hong Kong Policy
Act of 1992,1 to indicate our continuing interest in economic and political relations with
the territory and in the well-being and prosperity of its citizens. In addition to United
States actions and responses to moves taken by the PRC, recurrent questions surrounding
the PRC's intervention in the HKSAR's governance despite promises that Hong Kong
would enjoy at least fifty years of autonomy following its return to PRC sovereignty
remain difficult to answer.
In recent weeks, thousands of Hong Kong residents have once again taken to the streets
to call for greater democracy in the territory. Six years after the handover, the populace is
calling for the semi-autonomous Hong Kong government to speed up reforms that would
grant them more say in the choice of leaders and legislators. The first series of protests
last summer was triggered by the Hong Kong government's attempts to pass a security
law designed to prevent subversion against the central government in Beijing -- seen by
many as signal of an erosion of the freedoms the territory was promised under Hong
Kong's mini- constitution, the Basic Law. After an estimated half-a-million people
protested on July 1, Hong Kong's Chief Executive Tung Chee- hwa backed down and
delayed a vote on the controversial security bill, originally scheduled for early July, 2003.
Introduction. An increasing cause for concern in the international community is the
Chinese government's antagonism towards the desire of the Hong Kong people for the
establishment of a modicum of the democratic political process as expected under the
terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong's Basic Law by 2007. Hong
Kong's future has become even more problematic in the wake of the failed attempt to
enact draconian national security legislation pursuant to Article 23 of the Basic Law by
means of a truncated legislative process and the sympathetic reaction of many Hong
Kong residents to the goals of prodemocracy forces. Harsh rhetoric from Beijing has been
addressed to those in Hong Kong who publicly voiced their support for dissident
elements, boding ill for the enjoyment of promised civil liberties.
This drama has been played out in Hong Kong before, so the residents of Hong Kong are
understandably worried. A protracted series of negotiations lead to the adoption of the
Basic Law, a "mini-constitution" for post-1997 Hong Kong. Three successive drafts were
circulated, and public comment was invited. Strong public reaction to the undemocratic
nature of the government proposed for Hong Kong after 1997 in these drafts led to
strident statements from both PRC and Hong Kong representatives. Officials from China

threatened to impose a framework on Hong Kong unilaterally if its representatives
persisted in their "intransigence." To allay fears in Hong Kong over the prospect that the
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in force in Hong
Kong as a result of British colonial rule, would no longer apply after the Chinese
takeover, China agreed to its incorporation in the territory. Although British attention to
human rights in Hong Kong had been rather limited, the threat of the removal of this
basic underpinning for civil liberties was nonetheless troubling. Adherence to
international human rights standards and the conventions enunciating them since the
handover of Hong Kong has been generally good, with a few glaring exceptions which
will be noted below.
The Legal Framework. On July 1, 1997, the United Kingdom relinquished sovereignty
over Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China according to an agreement between
those two nations reached in 1984.2 As an international agreement between the two
nations which have had the most direct control over Hong Kong's fate, this document is
the starting point for any analysis of Hong Kong's post-1997 legal system. Yet, the Joint
Declaration itself merely anticipated the construction of a new framework to implement
the broadly-worded, precatory document that established the process for the transfer of
sovereignty.
On April 4, 1990, the Chinese National People's Congress in Beijing passed a Basic Law
for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,3 which came into effect in 1997; the
President of the PRC subsequently promulgated this law. Among other provisions, this
Basic Law contains guarantees of individual rights, leaving to future determination the
precise means for enforcement of these rights.
Current Rights Situation in Hong Kong. Despite its status as one of the United Kingdom's
last remaining colonies (or "Dependent Territories," in quaint British usage), Hong Kong
had come to enjoy considerable economic prosperity and rather extensive civil and
political liberties during the two decades immediately preceding its return to Chinese
sovereignty. The formal instruments of government were controlled by the appointed
Governor; the nominal legislature, Hong Kong's Legislative Council, was hardly a
democratic body. Its 56 members were either personally selected by the governor (20
non-official members) or elected by professional bodies and district boards (26 nonofficial members). An additional ten members were public servants, who served by virtue
of their official positions (10 official members). Yet, despite the undemocratic nature of
their selection, in the decade preceding 1997, the membership of the Legislative Council
had come to include (by appointment and election) a reasonably large group of younger,
outspoken members who voiced the concerns of the Hong Kong citizenry. Moreover, the
obvious concern of the Hong Kong government for the wellbeing of its people - manifest
in its commitment to public housing projects, mass transit and other infrastructural
improvements and public health and social welfare - convinced the populace of the
benign intentions of their unelected overseers.
As a British colonial dependency, Hong Kong also enjoyed many of the protections of
the unwritten English constitution and common law as well as the rule-of-law tradition.

These were - to a great extent - transplanted to Hong Kong and have taken root. The
Hong Kong judiciary, particularly at its higher levels, was scrupulously honest and
independent of (and resistant to) any executive or legislative interference with its
adjudication. Significant indigenization of the judiciary and the legal profession has
occurred over the past twenty-five years; local Chinese professionals are well trained and
already largely in control of these institutions. Until 1992, final appeals from the Hong
Kong Court of Appeal were taken to the Privy Council in London; since that time, in
preparation for Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, a new Final Court of
Appeal was established. The Chinese government, among other guarantees, promised that
Hong Kong could retain this legal system for at least 50 years after China recovers
sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Some Issues Arising from Hong Kong's Return to Chinese Sovereignty. As already
noted, the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China concluded a Joint
Declaration with three annexes in 1984 under which Britain has agreed to restore Hong
Kong to China on July 1, 1997. Hong Kong then became, pursuant to Article 31 of the
Chinese constitution, a Special Administrative Region(SAR) of China and, in the words
of the Joint Declaration, was expected to "enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in
foreign and defense affairs, which are the responsibility of the Central People's
Government." Following the ratification of the Joint Declaration in 1985, the National
People's Congress of China, through an appointed Basic Law Drafting Committee
(BLDC), undertook the writing of a Basic Law - in effect, a constitution for post-1997
Hong Kong - which was (among other things) to insure Hong Kong's autonomy: "[T]he
socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practiced in Hong Kong, and ... Hong
Kong's previous capitalist system and lifestyle shall remain unchanged for 50 years."
In connection with the transfer of sovereignty, the British government in Hong Kong
attempted to establish a toehold for representative government in Hong Kong before 1997
by aiming for the direct election of at least ten members to the Legislative Council by
1991, with further increases before 1997. Members of the pre-1997 Legislative Council
had proposed that at least 50 per cent of the seats there should be directly elected by
1997, with a mechanism put in place to provide for 100 per cent direct election by 2003.
The last British Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, proposed speeding up this
timetable to provide more representative rule by 1995. China threatened to "react" to any
precipitous rush toward participatory democracy in Hong Kong before 1997 as a hostile
act. In crude, almost scatological, language that echoed the denunciatory harangues of the
worst days of the Cultural Revolution, Patten, the British and any Hong Kong Chinese
who sided with them were vilified repeatedly and at great length. The parallels with
recent rhetoric emanating from Beijing is ominous.
Moreover, before 1997, in response the outpouring of popular support in Hong Kong for
the mainland pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989 and thereafter, thinly veiled threats
against Hong Kong individuals and groups issued from both the Chinese government and
its representatives in Hong Kong. China stated that it would not allow Hong Kong to
become a "base for subversion" against the People's Republic, although it has never made
clear what activities it would count as subversive. Three successive drafts of the Basic

Law were publicized, with little attempt to answer substantive criticisms of earlier drafts
by responsible Hong Kong parties (and Hong Kong members of the BLDC). Two
members of the BLDC who were also current members of the Legislative Council at that
time, teachers' union leader Szeto Wah and lawyer Martin Lee, were expelled from the
BLDC and accused of "counterrevolutionary activities" for their involvement in protests
against the 1989 massacre in and around Tiananmen Square. A Bill of Rights for Hong
Kong, which was supposed to be published in January 1990 by the Hong Kong
Government, was delayed because of mainland pressure. When it was eventually adopted
in June, 1991, the Chinese authorities announced that it would not bind them after 1997
and that they felt free to reject any or all of it after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty.
So much for guarantees that Hong Kong's pre-1997 legal system would continue in force!
A Brief History of PRC Interference in Hong Kong Governance. Almost immediately
after the establishment of the People's Republic of China on the mainland in 1949, the
Chinese government began a program of infiltration and sought to wield influence over
the affairs of the British colony which remained in Hong Kong. Once it became clear that
the British were not leaving Hong Kong, China reached a modus vivendi with the British
colonial government which permitted China, isolated from much of the world after the
Korean War, to use Hong Kong as a kind of entrepot for contact with the non-socialist
world. Much of China's foreign exchange was earned through Chinese-controlled
enterprises based in Hong Kong and from direct sales to Hong Kong of basic
commodities. Surplus population and individual malcontents were allowed to flee across
China's border with Hong Kong; eventually, almost two million refugees entered Hong
Kong from 1949 until the late 1960s. Whatever hopes China might have had that such an
influx would destabilize Hong Kong and encourage the British to leave were dashed by
Hong Kong's resilience; resources were mobilized to house and maintain at a subsistence
level the colony's swelling population.
At the end of the 1960s, China's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" washed over
into Hong Kong briefly, as political radicals sought to achieve - in line with then-current
political thinking on the mainland - the immediate revolutionary transformation of Hong
Kong and the expulsion of the colonial power. Militant trade unionists and other promainland activists tried their best to turn the populace against the British, but to no avail.
After a brief period of disorder, the government firmly re-established its control.
Successive temporary waves of immigrants from the mainland recurred, but they were
easily absorbed by Hong Kong's growing economy.
By the early 1980s, attention began to focus on the 1997 deadline for return of the leased
New Territories (which account for over 90 per cent of Hong Kong's total land area) to
China under the terms of an 1898 treaty. China made it clear that it would not
countenance any continuation of British control and that it intended to resume
sovereignty. As a practical matter, the rest of Hong Kong would have to revert along with
the New Territories. Initial resistance to China's stance, contemplated by then- British
Prime Minister Thatcher (flush from her victory in the Falklands), was later prudently
abandoned in the face of Chinese resolve. A handful of senior Hong Kong Chinese
officials were promised full British passports and residency in Britain, but only a pitiful

number availed themselves of the offer. On the other hand, the basic human rights of the
rest of Hong Kong's people were left to the determination of the same Chinese leaders
who ordered the People's Liberation Army to fire on students in Tiananmen Square. From
an international human rights perspective, this was clearly unacceptable; however, the
international community, which at that same time was scarcely bestir itself to worry
about Bosnia and Somalia in the throes of all-out war, proved unable to focus upon a
possible crisis in Hong Kong years before its return to the mainland.
Reasons for the Current Concern Over Democracy in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's Basic
Law, often described as a "mini-constitution," which was agreed by both sides before the
handover, allows the possibility of direct elections for the Chief Executive and all of its
Legislative Council from 2007. But it also says Beijing must approve any electoral
changes, which means China has the final say. China's Communist Party clearly fears
growing demands for full democracy could threaten its control over the territory and
possibly spread to mainland China. Some mainland officials have said they doubt Hong
Kong's patriotism after a massive protest against the local Bejing-backed government last
year. The march drew half a million people into the streets to denounce attempts by Hong
Kong leader Tung Chee-hwa to push through an unpopular anti-subversion bill. As the
Chairman well knows, having co-sponsored a Joint Resolution in the Senate last summer
expressing support for democracy in Hong Kong, both the legislative and executive
branches of the United States government have expressed serious concerns about
compliance with, and implementation of, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law in the
light of these experiences.
Notwithstanding these wide-ranging differences, there remains a great deal of common
interest between the United States and the PRC in the resolution of other numerous issues
which may make the PRC heed expressions of concern over the smooth transition in
Hong Kong in the runup to 2007. On the regional level, continuing peace and prosperity
in East and Southeast Asia and even free access to the high seas to the east and south of
the PRC will require China to maintain stability, balance and positive engagement with
the international community. Below, I attempt to examine just a few problem areas with
regard to pace of democratization in Hong Kong, and the legal underpinnings of the
claims made by both prodemocracy forces and representatives of the PRC insofar as the
gradual introduction of selfgovernance was promised to Hong Kong, to evaluate their
current status and to weigh various options for possible progress.
The Legal and Policy Bases for Democratization in Hong Kong after 1997 Under the
Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule in 1997 with
the understanding it would maintain limited self-government and be allowed to enjoy its
capitalist way of life at least until 2047. The current Chief Executive, C.H.Tung, was
installed for five years, and again in 2002 for a second term, after being selected by a proBeijing electoral committee. Hong Kong's local laws are passed by a 60- member
Legislative Council, but only 24 of its members are directly elected by Hong Kong
voters. The rest are selected by an electoral committee or by groups called "functional
constituencies," representing a small segment of the total population of seven million.
Ironically, the same Basic Law that required the government to enact the security

legislation which proved so broadly unpopular last summer also calls for it to pursue
greater democracy by 2007. Yet Tung's attempts to push ahead with the security laws,
while not moving on the democratization, has left many in the territory frustrated and
suspicious.
Rev. Louis Ha, a Roman Catholic priest, has said that the aim of the protests has been to
promote the drive for universal suffrage, as well as to educate people about democracy,
and encourage democratic values such as tolerance and respect in peoples' everyday lives.
The Catholic bishop of Hong Kong, head of Hong Kong's 230,000 Catholics, has also
appealed to the government to listen to the voices of the people. "Hong Kong people have
the quality and ability to rule ourselves," he has been quoted as saying. "Give us a chance
to show the whole world that we will do well on our own."
Recent Developments Affecting Prospects for Hong Kong's Democratization Communist
China welcomed back Hong Kong in 1997 under its "one country, two systems" policy,
whereby Hong Kong people could still enjoy a bustling free press, freedom of speech and
religion, and rule of law. It promised a fair degree of autonomy, and with Britain drafted
Hong Kong's the basic law. But when it comes to the "one country, two systems" policy
under which Britain handed Hong Kong over in 1997, there's a wide gulf between the
aspirations of the majority in Hong Kong and China's authoritarian rulers. What's
happening now in China is about the next steps toward democratization in Hong Kong in
2007. Democracy is being debated. What's being talked about is the right of Hong Kong
citizens in 2007 to elect a Chief Executive, like an American state governor, of their own
choice.
Hong Kong is not a full democracy. Under a complex system carried over from British
colonial days, only some politicians are freely elected, while trade groups and China also
have their say. People do not directly elect the Chief Executive. But over the past year,
hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens have expressed their desire for greater
democracy. As many as 100,000 people took to the streets on New Year's day, and
500,000 did so on July 1st last year. Under pressure, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa,
last year promised to draw up plans for a consultation process on the possible
introduction of direct elections in 2007. Pursuant to the Basic Law, 2007 is the earliest
chance for constitutional reform and movement towards the ultimate goal of direct
elections. The Basic Law provides that after 2007 major changes to the constitutional
framework in Hong Kong may take place, the ultimate aim of these changes being the
election of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by direct election. Last
month, a Hong Kong task force finished three rounds of talks with leaders in Beijing on
the future of democracy in the territory. Hong Kong's Chief Secretary for Administration
Donald Tsang and his team completed the talks after their meeting with the Chinese
parliament, the National People's Congress, to seek their advice on holding full elections
in Hong Kong by 2007. The Chief Secretary said of his mission, "The most important
thing of the trip is to give us an opportunity to express the public opinion. I think we have
reached that target," he told reporters, calling the result of the meeting "satisfactory."
Tsang said Beijing wants thorough discussions on principles before Hong Kong proceeds
with its constitutional development and a web page would be established to seek further

public opinion on the issues. Chinese leaders have appeared non-committal on the issue,
questioning only whether Hong Kong actually wanted universal suffrage.
The task force was created by Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee- hwa early this
year, following the street protests last summer calling for a speedier transition to
universal suffrage in the territory.
Reportedly, China will not allow Hong Kong to choose its next leader through full
elections, according to a local press report that quoted unnamed sources close to the
Beijing leadership. Also a consultation exercise to seek the public's view on increased
democracy in the city was just a "show" intended to placate the pro-democracy camp, the
South China Morning Post (SCMP) has reported. The source told the SCMP that Beijing
would draw up its own plan to guide what form the next selection process for the city's
chief executive would take in 2007. A three-day trip to Beijing last month by a task force
charged with seeking the Chinese leadership's opinion on the issue ended in near farce
when China's top leaders snubbed the delegation. Beijing later poured cold water on
democracy hopes, saying it would have the final say in how Hong Kong chooses its next
leader and that "patriots" would rule the territory. That sparked hot debate on what
defined a patriot and whether China would consider anti- government campaigners
patriotic enough to allow them to stand in any election. Beijing is also expected to take a
tougher position on Hong Kong if pro-democracy forces become the dominant power in
the territory's top law-making body in elections in September and then work against
Chinabacked leaders, according to unidentified sources. In 1997, Beijing established a
provisional legislature and effectively dismantled electoral changes made by Britain in
the waning years of colonial rule.
Post-2007 Political Reform and Democratization in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's
constitutional journey has been unique. Most former colonies were released from their
imperial power decades ago; Hong Kong was almost the last major territory to achieve
such status. Furthermore, these former colonies became independent and replaced their
former colonial administration with the institutions of democratic government. Hong
Kong was absorbed by another sovereign power, and preserved its former administration
almost unchanged. In Hong Kong's case, in fact, a virtue was made of continuity with the
colonial era. Many civil servants simply carried over.
Then, why does Hong Kong need reform? Hong Kong has an established system of rights
and operates by the rule of law. It enjoys a high standard of living and - aside from the
recent recession - consistently high levels of economic growth. Although many people
express discontent with the Government, there are no signs of mass unrest. And the PRC,
as sovereign, would have to be persuaded of the benefits of any reform. Is it worth
expending energy on the constitutional reform project? Some have suggested that the
current system might continue for several more decades, with full suffrage and direct
elections coming at the end of the fifty-year period, say in 2037, rather than "as early as"
2007.
Hong Kong's governance today is essentially that of a colonial administration, a form

more appropriate to the nineteenth than to the twenty-first century. The relatively
favorable outcome of this governance to date - at least in terms of living standards and
rights - should be regarded as exceptional. Particularly in the light of the few spectacular
glaring failures of the Tung administration, it is definitely not something that can be
relied upon for the long term. Also, under British rule there were certain checks and
balances on Hong Kong's colonial governance system, such as accountability to the
democratically-elected British Parliament. In that position today is China's National
People's Congress, a far different institution. It is not clear that in Hong Kong's present
situation the continued enjoyment of human rights, the rule of law, and ultimately of
living standards, can be assured.
By its own terms the constitution mandated by the Basic Law should begin to change with a gradual expansion of directly elected seats in the legislature and a progression,
albeit without a definite timetable, towards full democracy. As Hong Kong approaches
the ten-year anniversary of its handover, it is only common sense to plan for these
changes. Secondly, Hong Kong's governance structure increasingly seems inherently
unstable: a legislature enjoying an gradually growing mandate from the people but little
power, facing an executive selected by a narrowly-based committee which wields very
considerable power. It is highly unlikely that such a situation can accommodate the
changes that lie ahead. Finally, recent experience with the HKSAR's response to SARS
and the Article 23 legislation reveals how far Hong Kong needs to reform over the long
term.
The Chief Executive. Hong Kong's executive model is that of a colonial administration,
similar to the former administrations of Britain's other ex-colonies. The civil service
wields both substantial power of policy-making and power to administer policies. The
Chief Executive is selected by an Election Committee which is in turn selected by the
Mainland Chinese authorities or under their auspices - the latter process being conducted
in secrecy. With the departure of British administrators, many Hong Kong residents
believe that the executive tends to represent the interests of local business elite. At the
same time, the democratically-elected portion of the legislature appear to represent the
"have-nots," pressing for social-welfare policies such as a minimum wage, more public
housing, lower government charges and fees. This tends to polarize policy debates in the
HKSAR.
As provided in the Basic Law, the Chief Executive is expected to be chosen by direct
election eventually, even though the initial selection process provides for the narrower
and less democratic committee-selection process. Article 45 spells out the details:
Article 45
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected
by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's
Government.
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual

situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the
principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief
Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic procedures.
The specific method for selecting the Chief Executive is prescribed in Annex I:
"Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region".
Moreover, the Basic Law envisages an executive accountable to the legislature (Article
64). The legislature. The Basic Law sets out a program for increasing the proportion of
legislators elected by direct election. This was meant to increase the popular mandate and
legitimacy of the legislature. Increasing power for the Hong Kong Legislative Council, or
Legco, might follow the trajectory of the European Parliament, which when established
had little power, but gradually took more power. Also, being directly elected, the
European Parliament enjoyed greater legitimacy than the other European governmental
institutions, parallel to the experience in Hong Kong.
The majority of Legco's members are not directly elected and tend to side with the
government. Legco's voting procedures also handicap its effective performance. The
Hong Kong Legco also has almost as many committees as a large developed country
parliament like the UK, but only one-tenth as many legislators. In the 2000 Legco, 30
seats are from Functional Constituencies (professional groups, business and other sectors)
and 10 are selected by an Election Committee. In countries with bicameral legislatures,
frequently members of one chamber are selected other than by geographical direct
election. For example, the House of Lords in Britain includes not only hereditary and
appointed Lords but also bishops. The United States Constitution provides every State
with two Senators, while member of the House of Representatives are elected
proportionally to population. Yet, in most countries, these second chambers are with
another chamber which is fully directly-elected. Hong Kong's Functional Constituency
and Election Committee elections to the legislature are almost unique. The Election
Committee will not be used again. But by 2007, unless there is some change, the 30
Functional Constituency seats will continue to exist. This functional constituency system
is highly anomalous. In1998 - among other shortcomings - 10 out of 28 functional
constituencies were unopposed, while many others were returned by a "small circle" of
individual voters or by companies under common control. Three ways have been
suggested to address the issue of Hong Kong's functional constituencies: abolition
(arguing that they are anachronistic and should simply be abolished); reform ( to make
them more democratic and representative of the people); or dilution (to reduce their
influence by creating more directly elected seats). Any of these solutions would be
preferable to maintenance of the status quo. Here again, the Basic Law contemplates
eventual movement towards fully representative government. Article 68 makes clear its
"ultimate aim":
Article 68

The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
constituted by election.
The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the
actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with
the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the
members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.
The specific method for forming the Legislative Council and its procedures for voting on
bills and motions are prescribed in Annex II: "Method for the Formation of the
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting
Procedures."
The Judiciary . As the post-1997 experience has made painfully clear, the independence
of the judiciary cannot be relied upon when the power of the Executive is as pervasive as
it is in Hong Kong. It is ultimately unreasonable, in the absence of other strong
institutions of government, to expect individual judges to resist the executive. The
independence of the judiciary needs to be buttressed by strengthening other institutions
such as the legislature. Most notoriously, the judiciary's independence was circumscribed
after 1997 by the outcome of the Ng Ka Ling case, which arose out of a challenge to a
local Hong Kong immigration statute severely inhibiting right of abode in Hong Kong
(guaranteed in the Basic Law) for children born to parents resident in Hong Kong.
Exercising its power of constitutional judicial review to overturn several provisions
which derogated that right, the Court declared it would take a purposeful and generous
approach to interpreting constitutional rights guaranteed in the Basic Law. In its
judgment, the Court also explicitly declared that in deciding such disputes the Court of
Final Appeal (CFA) would have to determine when to refer provisions respecting localcentral relations or matters of central authority to the Standing Committee of the NPC.
The court concluded it was not required in this case.
The HKSAR government, at Chief Executive Tung's direction, filed a motion for the
CFA to "clarify" its judgment declaring its power to examine acts of the NPC. In a
second brief judgment, the Court explicitly stated that it did not hold itself above the
NPC, essentially restating its original position.
A more serious attack on the judgment and the rule of law occurred in May 1999 when
the government, after issuing a report claiming the judgment would produce a flood of
1.67 million migrants into Hong Kong, made a request to the Standing Committee of the
NPC to interpret the relevant provisions of the Basic Law, effectively seeking to overturn
the CFA judgment. As a result of this end-run around the CFA, the finality of judgments
of the CFA in Hong Kong has clearly been called into question and the rule of law has
been put in doubt. Full confidence in the rule of law requires both respect for the
authority of the CFA and confidence in its genuine ability to render final judgments.
A Note on Human Rights. These are enshrined in the Basic Law and in statute, and

protected by the courts. However, Article 23 of the Basic Law on subversion - which
occasioned such controversy last summer when attempts were made to push through
legislation implementing it - and other provisions such as those enabling the Chinese
Central Government to intervene in Hong Kong's affairs (Article 18) and to interpret the
Basic Law (Article 158), the superior privileges of "Chinese citizens", set limits on the
enjoyment of human rights. In practice, the non-democratic nature of government and the
power of the executive pose further dangers. Also, with regard to the media, there are
important issues of newspapers' selfcensorship and censorship by newspaper owners
which affect the actual enjoyment of freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law and
international human rights agreements.
Conclusion. The Basic Law of Hong Kong provides for the possibility of instituting full
direct popular democracy in 2007. Hong Kong is, therefore, at a stage where it makes
eminent good sense to look forward, to ask what type of political arrangements should be
made for the next steps in its democratic development, and to begin planning. For Hong
Kong, the issue is not whether to have or not have democracy or constitutionalism; these
institutional commitments are provided in an international agreement, the Sino-British
Joint Declaration. Furthermore, Hong Kong's own popular commitment to democracy,
human rights and the rule of law favors liberal constitutional democracy. Fundamental to
Hong Kong's economic future is the widely acknowledged fact that human rights and the
rule of law give economic actors more confidence in the system. Moreover, democratic
countries are better able to respond to crises such as the late-1990s' East Asian economic
crisis and the more recent SARS.
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration provides for democratic rights, as well as
incorporating in Hong Kong international human rights covenants. In practice, since the
handover, there have been some problematic developments and failures to make progress.
The current electoral system works to the advantage of a tiny elite. A two-thirds majority
of the Legco would have to vote to institute full universal suffrage after 2007. Even
amendments to government bills, proposed by legislators, require the Chief Executive's
approval to be considered. Even more problematic is the fact that amendment of the
Basic Law is vested in the National People's Congress (NPC).
Attacks on the judicial independence is probably the greatest causes for concern about
continued protection of human rights. On the other hand, continued exercise of freedom
of speech and association is the greatest cause for optimism. The 1991 Bill of Rights
Ordinance remains in force after the handover, minus certain key provisions; it copies
almost verbatim the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). At
least, the PRC government continues to file reports on behalf of Hong Kong under the
international human rights covenants. Yet, as is clear from the concerns expressed above
about the willingness of both the PRC and Hong Kong governments to follow through on
settled expectations about the pace of democratization in the HKSAR, much more
remains to be done. Judiciously applied, foreign pressure to maintain the pace established
by the HKSAR's foundational documents can encourage progress for the millions of
Hong Kong residents whose democratic aspirations should not be dashed.

